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Abstract
This paper develops a multi-industry general equilibrium model where en-
trepreneurs within each industry can decide to operate formally or informally.
The model generates a rich set of predictions including productivity cut-offs
for formal and informal firms to operate within different industries. In doing
so, it matches empirical research that finds an overlap in the aggregate produc-
tivity distributions of formal and informal firms, while being consistent with
theoretical predictions of strict duality within industries. Our explanation for
this outcome is that it is natural result of fixed costs varying across indus-
tries. We offer evidence that the overlap between formal and informal firms
in the aggregate is larger than the overlaps within industries for the case of
Indian manufacturing establishments. Our model is also consistent with other
features of the data in that it can explain high levels of competition between
formal and informal firms that decrease with formal firm size.
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1 Introduction
Informal firms are a ubiquitous feature in developing countries and are an important
step in the process of development. However, despite their prominence within devel-
oping countries, their relationship to and interactions with the formal sector remain
an area of active inquiry. A concrete understanding of how the formal and informal
sectors interact is of first-order importance to policy makers and informs questions
ranging from optimal taxation to the effects of trade liberalization.
Advances in the surveys of informal firms have led to a wealth of informative
micro-level data. This data has helped bring some clarity to the nature of informality,
but it has also led to new questions related to the interactions between formal and
informal firms. Prominent among these questions was the seeming contradiction
between the theoretical literature and empirical facts. The canonical theoretical
model developed by Rauch (1991) explains which entrepreneurs decide to operate
informal firms. A central result of the model is a strict size and productivity dualism.
The smallest (least productive) formal firm is still larger (more productive) than the
largest (most productive) informal firm. However, empirical research shows that
there is a clear overlap between formal and informal firms in productivity and/or
firm size distributions.1
The principal contribution of this paper is to model an alternative explanation
for the overlapping productivity distributions at the aggregate level. We show that
this overlap is the natural result of the relative entry costs of different industries.
Importantly, our formulation also allows for a version of strict duality within industry,
consistent with theoretical predictions such as Rauch (1991). Our explanation is
1 Examples include Taymaz (2009), Hsieh and Klenow (2010), Nataraj (2011), Busso et al. (2012)
Meghir et al. (2015), and Ulyssea (2017).
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broadly consistent with two salient features of the aggregate data: (1) on average
lower productivity firms tend to be informal and (2) high productivity informal
firms in some industries will be more productive than low productivity formal firms
in others. One central prediction of the model is that there should be greater overlap
between formal and informal productivity distributions in the aggregate than within
industries. We test this prediction using Indian manufacturing data and show that
there is indeed greater overlap in the aggregate distributions than in all but a handful
of very small industries.
Our work builds on two recent studies that make significant contributions in
explaining the overlap in productivity distributions. Meghir et al. (2015) addresses
this empirical fact that we observe both formal and informal firms with the same
productivity through formal and informal labor markets. In equilibrium firms may be
equally profitable being formal or informal by tailoring their wage offers to different
institutional frameworks. At certain productivity levels, firms may be indifferent
between hiring employees from formal or informal labor markets; thus we observe
both formal and informal firms with the same productivity. Alternatively, Ulyssea
(2017) shows that even within industries, there is a productivity overlap generated
by the entry of firms who do not know their ex ante productivity levels. Moreover,
his model draws policy conclusions by modeling both the status of the firm (formal
vs. informal) and the amount of labor hired from informal labor markets.
Our model builds on these works along several margins. First, we embrace a
multi-industry framework in order to evaluate how entry costs into different indus-
tries and sectors (i.e. formal vs. informal) influence productivity distributions and
competition. Second, our model more closely follows the framework of Melitz (2003),
where firms make the typical decisions about entry, production, and pricing, but also
must choose whether to operate formally or informally. We abstract away from the
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dual margins in Ulyssea (2017), instead creating strict productivity cut-offs for each
sector within each industry. These two elements generate across industry overlaps
while predicting strict duality within sectors. Third, we pay particular attention
to the within-industry productivity distributions and show that there is a smaller
degree of overlap within industries than in the aggregate productivity distributions
for formal and informal firms.
The intuition of the model is straightforward. Suppose there are two industries
H and L that have the same additional cost of being formal (i.e. the fee that must be
paid to register with the government), but industry H has a slightly higher fixed cost
of production. In this example, it would be less expensive for firms to enter both the
informal and formal sectors in industry L (relative to the formal and informal sectors
in industry H), and therefore the cut-off productivities for each sector in industry L
would be lower as well. However, because the fixed costs of production do not differ
greatly, the ordering of the cut-offs would most likely be: Informal entry into L <
Informal entry into H < Formal entry into L < Formal entry into H. These cut-
offs create a range of productivities where firms would decide to be formal in the
low-cost industry, but would not be productive enough to operate formally in the
high-cost industry. Therefore firms in this range of productivities between the last
two cut-offs will be formal in industry L but informal in industry H leading to an
observed overlap in the aggregate productivity distributions for formal and informal
firms.
This research also contributes by looking at within-industry levels of competition.
We motivate our model using two stylized facts that highlight key features of infor-
mal firms. First, we document that over half of the formal firms in our data report
competing against informal firms. This fact suggests that formal and informal firms
often inhabit the same economic space rather than producing in and serving distinct
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markets. This high level of competition is relatively consistent across different mea-
surements, geographic regions, and time. Second, the level of competition is lower
for larger, more productive firms. Together, these facts suggest a nuanced view of
across sector competition that we explore in our model.
The broader literature on informality provides a helpful context for this work. It
generally falls into three categories. On one end of the spectrum, De Soto (1989, 2000)
argues that the informal sector exists due to restrictive institutional constraints.
In his view, institutional reforms would unleash the creativity and entrepreneurial
spirit of the informal sector. Other authors argue that informality is simply a profit-
driven decision, and informal entrepreneurs operate informally to gain a competitive
advantage by avoiding costly regulations and taxation. (Farrell, 2004; Levy, 2008)
Tracing back to Lewis (1954), the dual view suggests that informal firms exist in
a separate economic space, distinct from formal firms. In his verbiage, there exists
a “subsistence” sector (informal sector) and a more productive “capitalist” sector
(formal sector). Firms in the capitalist sector do not truly compete with subsistence
firms due to their superior productivity. His work suggests that informality exists
as a stage in the process of development, and, importantly, dissipates as countries
develop. This branch of the literature includes seminal theoretical contributions such
as Harris and Todaro (1970) and Rauch (1991). These theoretical models have been
largely substantiated by empirical investigations done by La Porta and Shleifer (2008,
2014). For instance, they find that 91% of formal, or registered, firms began that
way (although entrepreneurs could have started firms in different sectors). There
is also evidence that suggests that informal firms may produce different goods than
formal firms. La Porta and Shleifer (2008) find considerable differences in value
added between the formal and informal sector, suggesting that formal firms produce
higher value goods than informal firms.
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This research is not intended to be a test between these viewpoints. Important
work by Ulyssea (2017) shows that there are firms that fit each of these “opposing”
viewpoints. Instead, we see our work as providing additional understanding about
how firms compete within industries, and how we should understand firm produc-
tivity across sectors. In summary, this paper reaches several important conclusions
that help frame how we should view informality. First, within a given industry, the
largest, most productive firms will be formal. Second, across industries, there will
be some informal firms that are more productive than formal firms. Third, informal
and formal firms compete, with the degree of competition decreasing as a function
of formal firms’ productivity.
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 presents our empirical motiva-
tion. Section 3 develops our model of the macroeconomy and Section 4 presents our
main theoretical results. Section 5 examines a central prediction of the model using
data on Indian manufacturing establishments. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Motivation
Our empirical motivation is divided into three sections. The first section documents
and describes our data sources. The second illustrates the high level of reported
competition between formal and informal firms and explores the degree to which
this finding is robust to different measures, survey years, and regions. The final
section investigates the relationship between competition, firm size (a proxy for pro-
ductivity), and development.
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2.1 The Data
We use survey data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys to motivate our theo-
retical model.2 These surveys are a stratified random sampling of manufacturing and
retail firms with five or more employees in the formal sector. We supplement this
survey data with macroeconomic indicators from the World Bank and the United
Nations Development Programme.
Our vintage of the Standardized Data contains countries surveyed between 2006
and mid-2016.3 In total, the data spans 140 different countries and over 124,000
firms. We use four main survey questions to capture competition and proxy for firm
productivity. The first measure of competition is a binary indicator for whether a
formal firm competes with informal firms. A second related measure asks formal
firms the degree to which informal competition is an obstacle to their operations.
We refer to these measures as our binary and categorical measures of competition,
respectively. Finally, we use the reported number of permanent full-time employees
and the number of full-time employees (permanent plus temporary) to condition our
findings on firm size and as a proxy for firm productivity.4 When appropriate, we
utilize the Enterprise Survey’s probability weights so that individual firms can be
properly weighted to reconstruct an approximation of the universe of manufacturing
and retail firms in a given country.5
2 This is one of the same data sources used by La Porta and Shleifer (2014).
3 Our data is the Standardized Data set released August 1st, 2016.
4 Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Appendix A.
5 A more in-depth discussion of the appropriate use of these weights can be found in the
implementation notes for each country-year survey. These notes can be found online at
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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2.2 Competition
Stylized Fact 1. A significant proportion of formal sector firms compete with in-
formal firms in developing countries.
Figure 1: Country-Level Means
The unit of observation is a country-year. All country means utilize the probability weights provided
by the World Bank Enterprise Survey. We drop all firms that did not answer either “yes” or “no”
to the survey question.
Nearly 51% of all frims in the data report that they compete with informal
firms.6 Figure 1 shows the proportion of firms that compete with informal firms
for each of the countries surveyed. While there is a broad range of competition,
all surveyed countries exhibit competition between formal and informal firms. We
perform a simple cross-country regression exercise to investigate important drivers of
6 Even if all non-responses and typos are included as facing no competition from informal firms,
about 43% of all firms say they compete.
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informality. It indicates that that competition is remarkably stable across regions and
time. Appendix B contains a complete regression table documenting the statistically
insignificant role of time and most region dummies. On average, countries in the
Americas tend to have slightly higher levels of competition, while countries in Asia
tend to have slightly lower levels of competition.
The degree of competition is not sensitive to the measure of competition. An
analysis of the categorical measure of competition yields similar conclusions. Across
countries and time, the average ranking is 1.33, meaning that the average formal
sector firm surveyed sees informal competition as being a minor to moderate obstacle.
Roughly 22% of surveyed firms reported that informal firms were a “very severe” or
“major” obstacle to their operations.7
Between these two measures of competition, we prefer the binary measure. First,
the categorical measure of competition is highly subjective. “Minor” may mean
something very different for different firms. Second, the binary nature of the first
measure allows for an easy interpretation of the country-level mean: the percentage
of firms that compete with informal firms. This result is of importance because of
the link it provides to productivity. Subject to the necessary caveats with respect
to survey data and measuring competition from only a formal perspective, we find
the evidence quite compelling that formal and informal firms tend to compete in
a meaningful way.8 In the broader debate about informality, our data has clear
parallels in Maloney (2004) which suggests there is a larger degree of integration
between the formal and informal sectors than is suggested by a strict interpretation
of the dual view.
7 This statistic excludes non-responses. It is likely an underestimate of informal competition since
small firms are underrepresented and are more likely to cite informal firms as significant obstacles.
8 Making inferences about informal firms based on survey data collected from formal sector firms
is not uncommon. See Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) for a typical example.
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2.3 Firm Size and Competition
Stylized Fact 2. There is an inverse relationship between firm size and whether a
formal firm competes with informal firms.
The Enterprise Survey data also offers evidence to suggest that smaller formal
firms are more likely to compete with informal firms. This result’s importance is
magnified by the link between firm size and a firm’s productivity. Many theoretical
papers assume a direct link between firm size and productivity. This is the case for
instance in Melitz (2003). Empirical work has also tended to support this conclusion.9
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we take the positive relationship between
firm size and productivity as given and often use them interchangeably.
Pooling the data across countries and survey years and regressing our binary com-
petition measure on firm size shows that firm size is negatively related to whether
a formal firm reports competing with informal firms. Table 1 reports the weighted
regression results across several different specifications. The linear probability model
in column (3) suggests that increasing firm size by 1% would decrease the probabil-
ity that a firm competes with informal firms by .41%. We prefer this specification
due to its straightforward interpretation. The negative relationship is seen in our
other less involved specifications (columns (1) and (2)) which allow for a larger sam-
ple. Columns (4) and (5) estimate our preferred specification using logit and probit
regressions, respectively, to account for the well known deficiencies of hypothesis
testing with the linear probability model. Finally, these results are also robust to
our more expansive definition of labor: permanent and temporary full-time workers.
Those results are documented in Table 4 in Appendix C.
In both of our regression exercises, the cross-country regressions and the pooled
9 For an example pertaining to the developing world see So¨derbom and Teal (2004).
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Table 1: Competition and Firm Size: Pooled Regressions
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS Logit Probit
Log firm size -0.0298*** -0.0263*** -0.0386*** -0.1637*** -0.1010***
(0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0254) (0.0156)
Log GDP/capita -0.0396*** -0.0516*** -0.2183*** -0.1352***
(0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0277) (0.0170)
Industry fixed effects no no yes yes yes
Region fixed effects no no yes yes yes
Time fixed effects no no yes yes yes
N 103,747 88,783 82,587 82,587 82,587
Conditional Means
Small (< 20) 55.6% 56.2% 55.5%
Medium (20-99) 49.2% 49.7% 49.4%
Large (100+) 42.4% 42.9% 42.7%
The dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a firm competes with informal firms. Firm
size is measured as the number of permanent full-time employees. All specifications utilize proba-
bility weighting. Regional dummies are Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, or Oceania. Sector fixed
effects are based on two-digit ISIC codes. We drop industries that cannot be estimated with a
logit/probit to maintain the same sample across specifications (3), (4), and (5). Standard errors
are provided in parenthesis. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)
levels.
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firm-level regressions, show a negative relationship between income per capita and
informality. We are wary of any causal interpretation of this result as there are
a host of potential channels and/or mitigating factors that we cannot account for
with our data. The observed relationship is important because it illustrates that the
data we use to derive our stylized facts is consistent with the data used by others to
substantiate the dual view of informality, particularly La Porta and Shleifer (2008,
2014).
Our review of the data leaves us with two motivating facts that must be reflected
in our theoretical model. First, the data is clear that at least some formal sector
firms face competition from informal firms. In truth, a large percentage of formal
sector firms likely face this type of competition. Second, the likelihood that a firm
faces informal competition decreases with its size (productivity).
3 Model
Our theoretical model builds on the framework developed by Melitz (2003), with two
significant differences. First, we add an industry layer to the economy. Second, we
embed the choice for firms to be informal or formal. We refer to this decision as
a firm’s sectoral choice. These two additions generalize the work of Melitz (2003)
and build the necessary framework to examine whether and how formal and informal
firms compete.
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3.1 Model Set-Up
3.1.1 Households
Suppose there is a representative household that is endowed with income, Y . The
household seeks to maximize its consumption, c, which is a Cobb-Douglas composite
of goods produced in the I industries of the economy. Therefore, the household’s
problem can be written as:
maximize
Ci
c =
I∑
i=1
ηilog(Ci)
subject to
I∑
i=1
PiCi = Y,
where Ci, Pi, and ηi represent aggregate consumption, the price level, and preferences
for goods in industry i, respectively. We assume that industry preferences (ηi) sum
to one across all industries. The standard solution to the household’s consumption
problem is
PiCi = ηiY = Ri, i ∈ {1,I }, (1)
where Ri is the total revenue of firms in industry i. Within each industry there is
a mass of firms that produce distinct varieties, ω ∈ Ωi. Industry production of the
consumption good, Ci, and prices, Pi, are CES aggregates of the varieties produced
in industry i:
Ci =
(∫
ω∈Ωi
ξi(ω)Ci(ω)
dω
) 1

(2)
Pi =
(∫
ω∈Ωi
pi(ω)
1−σdω
) 1
1−σ
, (3)
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where pi(ω) is the price of variety ω and ξi(ω) is a preference parameter for formal
and informal goods. We assume that individual’s have lower preference for informal
goods, such that:
ξi =
 1 if formal
ξi ≤ 1 if informal
.
Varieties are substitutes for each other such that 0 <  < 1 and the elasticity of
substitution between varieties is σ = 1
1− > 1.
Using equations (1) and (2) it can be shown that the demand for each variety is
given by
Ci(ω) = Ci
(
Piξi(ω)
pi(ω)
)σ
. (4)
3.1.2 Government
Government in the model plays two roles. First, it collects tax revenue from firms in
the formal sector. Each formal sector firm is taxed τ percent of their profits. Second,
the government locates and fines informal firms at a rate µ. Informal firms that are
caught forfeit the entirety of their profits. The government’s total revenue, T , is
described by
T =
I∑
i=1
[
τ
∫
ω∈Fi
pi(ω)dω + µ
∫
ω∈Ii
pi(ω)dω
]
, (5)
where pi(ω) is the profitability of the firm producing good ω and Fi and Ii refer to
set of firms operating in the formal and informal sectors in industry i, respectively.10
All revenue collected by the government is transferred back to the household as a
lump-sum payment.
10 We assume that all firms are either entirely formal or entirely informal. Possible extensions to
the model may allow formal firms to hide part of their operation or allow informal firms to avoid
detection by paying bribes. We abstract away from this complications to prioritize tractability
of the model.
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3.1.3 Aggregate Market Clearing
After accounting for taxes and fines, firms’ net profits are transferred back to the
household as a dividend:
D =
I∑
i=1
(1− τ)
∫
ω∈Fi
pi(ω)dω + (1− µ)
∫
ω∈Ii
pi(ω)dω. (6)
Finally, market clearing implies that:
Y = wILI + wFLF + T +D =
I∑
i=1
Ri. (7)
Total wage labor, wILI+wFLF , is determined by a nominal wage rate ws that differs
between formal and informal firms (wI < wF ), and the labor supply L = LI +LF .11
Total income Y , in the economy is equivalent to total firm revenue. Note that
Equations (1) and (7) imply that the total revenue of each industry is fixed and is
determined entirely by household income and preferences.
3.2 Firm Structure
3.2.1 Industry Entry
Each firm decides whether to enter industry i and produce its own variety ω. Entry
into an industry requires the firm to pay a fixed cost f e.12 After a firm enters
an industry and pays the associated fixed cost, our model parallels Melitz (2003).
All firms receive a productivity draw φ from a common distribution g(φ). This
distribution is accompanied by the usual assumptions, mainly that g(φ) has support
11 Below we discuss the impact of formal and informal firms paying different wage rates.
12 As in Melitz (2003) all fixed costs are written in terms of units of labor.
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on the interval (0,∞), and we represent the continuous cumulative distribution for
firm productivity as G(φ). Upon realizing its productivity, a firm may either decide
to produce or immediately exit. In an effort to conserve notation, the industry
indicator i will be used only when deemed necessary.
3.2.2 Sectoral Entry
Firms may decide to operate either formally or informally. Throughout the paper,
firms operating informally are denoted with an I and firms operating formally with
an F . Superscripts are used to denote variables that are unique to the formal or
informal sector. Both types of firms can choose to operate in each industry i and
enjoy market power by producing a unique variety, ω. Within an industry, firms
compete via monopolistic competition.
It is worth emphasizing how our assumptions relate to our research question. Of
central interest is how and whether formal and informal firms compete. Assuming
that all firms are monopolistically competitive does not ex ante assume the answer
to this question. In fact, our model is general enough to support a variety of views
of the informal economy. In particular, it could underscore the view that informal
firms operate in their own economic space. In this way, informal firms would produce
goods in the first n industries such that i ∈ {1, n} and formal firms produce goods
in the remaining industries i ∈ {n+ 1,I }. In equilibrium both types of firms would
exist; however, formal and informal firms would not compete within industries.
3.2.3 Production
Producing firms have access to an increasing returns production function that is
different across industries and depends on whether a firm is formal or informal. As
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a result, the firm’s labor demand function is:
lsi = f
s
i +
Ci(ω)
φ
for s ∈ {I, F}, (8)
where s denotes the firm’s sectoral choice (informal or formal). Additionally, we
assume the following inequalities hold:
f Ii ≤ fFi , f si−1 ≤ f si ,
fFi
f Ii
≤ f
F
i−1
f Ii−1
.
The first inequality says that formal firms face higher costs than informal firms re-
gardless of industry. This assumption is rather intuitive as formal firms face higher
costs due to registration fees and other government regulation. The second inequality
orders the industries in terms of increasing levels of cost, this is done without loss of
generality in order to compare outcomes across industries. Finally, the third inequal-
ity says that the ratio of formal and informal costs are falling as overall firm costs
increase. This follows from the fact that administrative costs for formal firms become
an ever decreasing share of production costs as industries become more complex. For
instance, the higher costs associated with operating in the manufacturing industry
would mean that administration costs represent a smaller share of total costs when
compared to the retail industry. Additionally, we assume that the substitutability
between formal and informal firms is falling in industry complexity (ξi−1 ≥ ξi). The
thought behind this is that as fixed costs increase, so does the complexity of the
goods that those firms produce. Therefore, consumers are more discriminating over
how their goods are made. For example, a person may care very little whether a
pineapple is from a grocery store or a fruit vendor, but they probably do care if their
laptop was made by Apple or by someone in their basement. Because all firms face
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the same residual demand curve, they choose a price equal to a constant mark-up
over marginal cost:
p(φ) =
ws
φ
. (9)
We proceed by assuming that there is a minimum wage (normalized to 1) that all
formal firms must pay, while informal firms can pay a wage wI < 1 (the informal
wage is shared across industries due to the free movement of labor).
The labor demand function in Equation (8) along with the pricing rule in Equa-
tion (9), imply that the firm’s profits and revenues depend both upon their produc-
tivity as well as their sector s. The expression for profits is given by
pisi (φ) =
Ri
σ
ws(Piφ)
σ−1
(
ξsi
ws
)σ
− wsf si for s ∈ {I, F}. (10)
ri(φ) = Riw
s(Piφ)
σ−1
(
ξsi
ws
)σ
(11)
3.2.4 Cut-offs
There is a large pool of possible entrants into each industry. Firms pay a fixed cost in
order to receive a productivity draw from the cumulative distribution G(φ).13 Once
the firm receives their draw, they immediately decide whether or not to exit. Firms
will exit if their profits are negative and because firm profits are increasing in the
firm’s productivity, there exists a productivity (φ∗) below which all firms exit. This
implies that the distribution of productivities among operating firms is:
γi(φ) =
 g(φ)1−G(φ∗i ) if φ ≥ φ∗i
0 otherwise
. (12)
13 The distribution is the same across sectors.
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The firm’s decision to enter and produce depends upon the profitability of produc-
tion and the expected value of entry. As shown in Equation 10, a firm’s profitability
depends upon productivity as well as sector. This implies that the zero profit con-
dition depends upon the structure of the industry.14 In contrast, because paying
the fixed cost of entry takes place prior to the realization of productivity and thus
sectoral choice, there is a single free entry condition (FE), regardless of the industry
structure.
It should be noted that the sectoral choice by the firm means that the relationship
between average profits/revenues and productivity depends upon the distribution,
G(·). It will prove to be mathematically convenient to express the zero profit con-
dition (henceforth ZPC) in terms of average revenue, r¯, rather than average profits.
Additionally, because the ZPC is written down in terms of average revenue, the free
entry condition must be as well.
Lemma 1. The zero profit and free entry conditions can be written in terms of
average revenue as a function of the minimum productivity level, φ∗. For an industry
i where formal and informal firms coexist (a mixed industry is denoted I) these
conditions are:
r¯ =
(
φ˜(φ∗)
φ∗
)σ−1
σf I
(
wI
ξ
)σ
(ZPC) (13)
where φ˜(φ∗) is defined as:
φ˜(φ∗i ) =
[
1
1−G(φ∗i )
(∫ ∞
φ¯
φσ−1g(φ)dφ+ wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ ∫ φ¯
φ∗
φσ−1g(φ)dφ
)] 1
σ−1
. (14)
14 In an industry with both formal and informal firms, firms require lower revenue to be willing
to produce as they have the option of paying the lower fixed costs of operation associated with
informality.
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r¯ =
σ(f e + (G(φ¯)−G(φ∗))(1− µ)f I + (1−G(φ¯))(1− τ)fF )
(G(φ¯)−G(φ∗))wI ( ξ
wI
)σ
(1− µ)
[
φ˜I
φ˜
]σ−1
+ (1−G(φ¯))(1− τ)
[
φ˜F
φ˜
]σ−1 (FE)
(15)
where φ¯ is the formality cut-off productivity (defined in Lemma 2), and φ˜F and φ˜I
refer to the average productivity of formal and informal firms, respectively.
Proof. See appendix A.
In an industry with only formal firms (F) the ZPC instead depends on the fixed
cost of operation for formal firms, fF and φ¯ = φ∗. The minimum productivity cut-
off, φ∗, is determined by the intersection of the free entry and zero profit conditions.
However, without additional assumptions regarding the distribution of productivities
it is not possible to determine where the intersection occurs, if it occurs at all. The
next section will place additional structure on G(·) and derive the main results of
the paper.
The second cut-off of interest is the formality cut-off which we designate φ¯. In
particular, the formality cut-off within an industry occurs where EpiI(φ¯) = piF (φ¯).
Lemma 2. Suppose that within industry i there are both informal and formal firms.
There exists a productivity level, φ¯, such that firms who draw a productivity level φ
greater than φ¯ enter the formal sector. Moreover, this formality cut-off, φ¯, can be
explicitly written as:
φ¯ = Fˆ φ∗ (16)
where
Fˆ =
[(
ξ
wI
)σ
((1− τ)fF − (1− µ)wIf I)
((1− τ)− (1− µ)wI ( ξ
wI
)σ
))f I
] 1
σ−1
.
In order for both informal and formal firms to exist in the same industry (Fˆ > 1),
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we require:
wI
(
f I
fF
)1/σ
< ξ < wI
(
1− τ
wI(1− µ)
)1/σ
Before moving on it is should be noted that one additional constraint must be
imposed in order for there to be both formal and informal firms in the economy:
ξ < (wI)
σ−1
σ
which ensures that rF (φ) > rI(φ) ∀φ.
3.2.5 Aggregation
Firm level prices and productivities can be aggregated in the same manner as Melitz
(2003). The industry price given in Equation (3) can be written as:
Pi =
[
1
1−G(φ∗i )
∫ ∞
φ∗i
p(φ)1−σMig(φ)dφ
] 1
1−σ
, (17)
where Mi is the mass of firms operating in industry i. Using Equations (14) and (17)
the industry specific aggregate price level, quantity produced, revenue, and profits
can be written as:
Pi = M
1
1−σ
i p(φ˜i) (18)
Ci = M
1

i Ci(φ˜i) (19)
Ri = PiCi = Miri(φ˜i) = Mir¯i. (20)
21
4 Results
The results in this section can be divided into two categories. The first pertain to
results within industries. For clarity, we continue to omit the industry subscript and
specify whether an industry is mixed or strictly formal. In order to clarify notation
and avoid piece-wise definitions, equations default to a mixed industry (I). We
address any differences with a strictly formal industry (F) in the text or footnotes.
The second set of results pertains to comparisons across industries. Accordingly, we
reintroduce the industry subscript, i, for those results.
4.1 Equilibrium
This section analytically derives the main results of the model using the Pareto
distribution with minimum value k and shape parameter α. Appendix E includes
numerical results that show that results from this section hold for a wide range
of well-behaved distributions (log-normal, weibull, exponential). The first step in
solving the model is to find the average productivity for the entire industry, as well
as for informal and formal firms.
Lemma 3. The average productivities of a mixed industry (φ˜), and for formal (φ˜F )
and informal (φ˜I) firms within that industry, are directly proportional to the cut-off
value, φ∗.15 They are given by
• φ˜ = ( α
1+α−σ
) 1
σ−1
[
FˆI
−1−α+σ
+ wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ
(1− Fˆ−1−α+σI )
]
φ∗,
• φ˜I =
[(
1− FˆαI
)−1 (
1− Fˆ−1−α+σI
) (
α
1+α−σ
)] 1σ−1
φ∗,
• φ˜F = ( α
1+α−σ
) 1
σ−1 FˆIφ∗.
15 In order to ensure that the cut-offs are positive we assume that σ < 1 + α
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Proof. All proofs can be found in Appendix D.
In an industry where all firms are formal, Lemma 3 collapses to its first point.
From Lemma 3 we can determine how the zero profit condition and the free entry
condition depend on the cut-off value φ∗.
Proposition 1. Suppose that a given industry is mixed in that it has both formal
and informal firms. If the underlying distribution of firm productivities is Pareto with
minimum value k and shape parameter α, then the zero profit condition is horizontal
with respect to φ∗, and it is given by:
r¯ =
(
α
1 + α− σ
)[
FˆI
−1−α+σ
+ wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ
(1− Fˆ−1−α+σI )
]
σf I
(
ξ
wI
)−σ
. (ZPC)
(21)
The free entry condition is upward sloping with respect to φ∗ and is given by:
r¯ =
[
FˆI
−1−α+σ
+ wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ
(1− Fˆ−1−α+σI )
]
σ
[(
φ∗
k
)α(
f e
F¯I
)
+ f I
(
ξ
wI
)−σ]
, (FE)
(22)
where
F¯I = Fˆ−1−α+σI (1− τ) + wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ (
1− Fˆ−1−α+σI
)
(1− µ).
Proof. The proof is a direct application of Lemmas 1 and 3.
Proposition 1 can be readily applied to industries that are strictly formal by
setting all f I = fF and letting F¯F = (1− τ). We use Proposition 1 to calculate the
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cut-off value φ∗ for a mixed industry:16
φ∗ = k
[
f IF¯I(σ − 1)
f e(1 + α− σ)
(
ξ
wI
)−σ] 1α
. (23)
Note that in order to ensure that φ∗ > k, we assume that the fixed cost of entry is
sufficiently low that
f e <
f IF¯I(σ − 1)
1 + α− σ
(
ξ
wI
)−σ
.
Not surprisingly, the cut-off value is increasing in the fixed cost of production, as
greater fixed costs require more productive firms to cover them.
There are two key questions that can be answered within the framework above.
First, how does the equilibrium with both informal and formal firms within an in-
dustry differ from one with only formal firms? If formal firms are thought to be
beneficial for the process of development, then it is important to understand what
effect informality has on an industry. The second question deals with the empirical
results found in the literature. Can this model demonstrate the size and productivity
dualism that we would expect, while still showing the productivity overlap between
formal and informal firms seen in the data? Starting with the first question, we
proceed with Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose that we have two industries that share the same fixed costs,
revenues, and tax rates, but they differ in their probability of closing and fining
informal firms. In the first industry µ = 1 such that there are no informal firms
(F). In the second industry µ < 1 such that there are both formal and informal firms
16 Other papers have shown that there is a overlap in productivities within an industry (see Ulyssea,
2017 for a recent example). Our model is consistent theoretical duality of Rauch (1991), however
it would be possible to generate an overlap in productivities within an industry by adding some
noise to the productivity draw. This would cause some firms at the margin to opt into the
“wrong” sector.
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within the industry (I). Under such conditions, each of the following is true:
1. φ∗I < φ
∗
F < φ¯I
2. r¯I < r¯F
3. MI > MF
4. MFI < M
F
F
Proof. See Appendix D.17
These results describe the main effects of informality. First, Propostion 2.1 shows
that informality allows lower productivity firms to enter into the market. This is a
result of the lower fixed costs associated with being informal. Productivity draws
that previously could not afford to enter the market, now can. However, the effect
of having lower productivity firms enter the market is that the cut-off to become
formal increases. Firms need a higher productivity draw to enter into the formal
sector. Proposition 2.2 reflects that with lower average productivity and greater
competition, average revenue falls due to informality. Proposition 2.3 ties the greater
range of entering firms and lower average productivity to a larger mass of firms in
the mixed industry. Finally Proposition 2.4, is driven by the decrease in average
revenue. Lower average revenue makes it more difficult to cover the fixed costs of the
formal sector, which in turn shrinks the formal sector relative to the industry with no
informal competition. It is important to note that the results found in Proposition
2 are consistent with Rauch (1991) as there is a distinct cut-off between the formal
and informal sectors within an industry.
Another empirical result from the survey data is that smaller formal firms indi-
cate that they face more competition from informal firms. We can measure informal
17 Note: φ∗x, φ¯x, r¯x,Mx, and M
F
x stand for the productivity cut-off for informal firms, productivity
cut-off for formal firms, average revenue, total mass of firms, and the mass of firms that are
formal, respectively. x indicates whether the economy is formal only (F) or mixed (I).
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competition indirectly by comparing the profits that formal firms make when they
face informal competition to those that they make when there is only formal compe-
tition. This measure gives us an idea of how much profit firms “lose” as a result of
informal competition. Explicitly, for a given productivity φ, the percentage of profit
lost (PPL) due to informal competition can be calculated as:
PPL(φ) =
piFF (φ)− piFI (φ)
piFF (φ)
(24)
which brings us to our next proposition.
Proposition 3. The percentage of profit lost due to informality is declining in firm
productivity.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 3 states that more productive (larger) firms lose a smaller share of
their profits as a result of informal competition. This is consistent with the data
in that larger (more productive) firms are less likely to compete against informal
firms. The reason for this result is that larger more productive firms charge lower
prices than their competition. When smaller, less productive informal firms enter
the market they charge high prices posing little competitive threat to their more
productive formal counterparts. However, those firms on the margin between formal
and informal face greater competition because their prices are more similar.
Several studies have documented an overlap in the size and productivity distri-
butions for formal and informal firms. Based on the model, it is clear that within
industry there will be no overlap between formal and informal firms. This result echos
the seminal theoretical contribution of Rauch (1991). However, it is highly likely that
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there will be overlapping productivity distributions across industries, which brings
us to our final proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that industries are ordered from lowest fixed costs of oper-
ation to highest, such that f si−1 < f
s
i ,∀i and s ∈ {I, F}. Under such conditions, the
following are true:
1. φ∗i−1 < φ
∗
i
2. r¯i−1 < r¯i
3.
MFi−1
Mi−1
<
MFi
Mi
4. If
(
fIi
fIj
F¯i
F¯j
) 1
α 6= Fˆj
Fˆi
for some {i, j}, then there is an overlap between the informal
and formal sectors across industries.
Proof. See Appendix D.
These results describe the effects of different fixed costs across industries. First,
Proposition 4.1 shows that higher cost industries have higher productivity cut-off
values. This is quite intuitive as higher costs necessitate higher productivities in order
to be profitable. The higher cut-off values result in higher average productivities (see
Equation 14), increasing the average revenue of firms (Proposition 4.2). Additionally,
as industry costs increase they cause the ratio of formal to informal costs to fall,
and the percentage of firms that are formal increases (Proposition 4.3). This result
is driven by the ratio fF/f I . As it falls, the economic benefits of being informal
diminish, resulting in a greater percentage of firms opting to be formal.
The final result in Proposition 4 deals with the overlap in firm productivities
across industries. From above, we know that the formal cut-off, φ¯, for an industry
is a function of the cut-off value, φ¯ = Fˆ φ∗. As long as φ¯i 6= φ¯j, we will observe
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an overlap in productivity distributions across industries. In this case, the overlap
would occur across the productivity range {φ¯i, φ¯j}.18 Intuitively, this follows from
the different costs of entry. Some industries will have lower cut-offs for formality
than others, ultimately resulting in lower productivities for formal firms in those
industries relative to informal firms in others.
Figure 2: Overlap of Informal and Formal Firms across Industries.
ϕ1*
r
ϕ2* ϕ1 ϕ2
r
ϕ*
r
The figure shows the ZPC (horizontal line) and FE (upward sloping line) for two industries. The
vertical axis is average industry revenue, and the horizontal axis measures productivity. The inter-
section of the two lines in each industry determine the informality productivity cut-off (φ∗i ). The
formality cut-off is determined using φ∗i and Fˆi for each industry. The range between the formality
cut-offs in each industry is the overlap region (indicated by the grey box).
Figure 2 shows the overlap (grey shaded area) region that is described in Propo-
18 For instance, assume that φ¯i < φ¯j . Industry i the firms with productivities in the range {φ¯i, φ¯j}
would be formal but they would be informal in industry j.
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sition 4 for industries 1 and 2. It should be noted that Figure 2 is only one of three
possible outcomes for the overlap region. In the figure, industry 2 not only has the
higher entry cut-off, but also a higher formality cut-off. For firms with productivity
in the range {φ¯1, φ¯2}, they will be capable of operating formally in industry 1, as
they exceed the formality cut-off. At the same time, their productivity is too low
to operate in industry 2, such that they will have to operate informally in industry
2. We find this to be the most intuitive outcome as high fixed cost industries would
likely have higher fixed costs for entry in the formal sector. However, it is possible
that for a given set of fixed costs that the formality cut-off in industry 2 can be less
than the the cut-off in industry 1, this would still result in an overlap across the two
industries.19
This model ultimately predicts that there is strict productivity and size duality
within an industry, but an overlap across industries. It should be noted that while
the strict duality is a strong result, it comes about because firms perfectly observe
their productivity. If they observed their productivity with noise, firms around the
formality cut-off would misallocate themselves creating an overlap within industries
as well. Overall, even in a model with noise, we would expect that the aggregate
overlap across industries would be greater than the overlap between informal and
formal firms within an industry.
19 It should be noted that if the equation in result 4 of Proposition 4 holds with equality, there will
be no overlap and the formality cut-off will be the same across industries. This is a knife edge
condition. In order for this model not to be consistent with the empirically observed overlap the
equation:
(
fIi
fIj
F¯i
F¯j
) 1
α
=
Fˆj
Fˆi
would have to hold for all {i, j}.
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5 A Case Study of Indian Manufacturing Establishments
In this section, we test a central conclusion of our model: the degree of overlap
between the aggregate distributions of productivity for informal and formal firms
should be larger than the overlap within industries. While our model predicts that
the latter should not overlap at all, i.e. strict duality, this result stems from the lack
of uncertainty in the model. In reality, firms do not perfectly know their productiv-
ity. This naturally leads to overlaps even when theory predicts strict cut-offs. For
instance, work that has looked at the productivity cut-offs for exporters based on
Melitz (2003) have identify “fuzzy” cutoffs (Delgado et al. (2002), Cassiman et al.
(2010), Girma et al. (2005)). Ulyssea (2017) documents that, even after controlling
for variation in productivity across industries using a set of industry dummies, there
is overlap in the residual productivity distributions of formal and informal firms. We
take that analysis one step further and look at whether the degree of overlap within
individual industries exceeds the overlap in the aggregate. Such a finding would be
consistent with our theoretical model given uncertainty in the real world.
Figure 3 provides an example of our problem. It shows the aggregate productivity
distributions for formal and informal firms (bold) relative to the formal and informal
productivity distributions for the largest individual industry in our data (manufac-
ture of boxes and crates) for the years 1999-2001. Visually, it appears that the
industry-level overlap is substantially smaller than for the aggregate distributions.
We test whether this pattern holds across industries in our data.
To capture the degree of overlap between the productivity distributions of the for-
mal and informal sectors, we calculate two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statis-
tics (henceforth K-S). This statistic captures the extent to which two distributions
differ from each other. A larger K-S statistic implies a greater difference between
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Figure 3: Aggregate vs. Industry-Level Overlaps
Log TFP is as calculated in Nataraj (2011). Both the aggregate and industry distributions are
limited to 1999-2001 data. The plotted industry is the largest industry in our sample for 1999-2001
(manufacture of wooden boxes and crates).
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the two distributions and a smaller degree of overlap. Let F (φ) and I(φ) represent
the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of productivity for formal and infor-
mal firms respectively, either within an industry or in the aggregate. The K-S test
statistic then is
D = max(Dupper, Dlower), (25)
where
Dupper = |maxφ{F (φ)− I(φ)}| (26)
Dlower = |minφ{F (φ)− I(φ)}|. (27)
Intuitively, the K-S statistic captures the largest difference between the two CDFs.
Since the informal sector tends to have a large number of relatively low productiv-
ity firms, the informal CDF is stochastically dominated by the formal CDF at low
productivity levels, making Dlower the relevant metric in almost all industries.
To generate the empirical cumulative distribution functions, F (φ) and I(φ), we
use productivity estimates for Indian manufacturing establishments from Nataraj
(2011). Formal sector data come from the Survey of Industries (ASI) and informal
sector data come from the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSS). Our sample
contains over 282,000 establishments over three time periods: 1989-1990, 1994-1995,
and 1999-2001, and covers firms in 139 different industries (by India’s National In-
dustrial Classification (NIC-87)).20 It also contains sampling weights allowing us
to scale our sample to reflect the productivity distributions for all manufacturing
establishments in India.21
20 For the final time period, formal firms are survey from 1999-2000 and informal firms are surveyed
from 2000-2001.
21 Firms with more than one establishment in a given state and industry may provide a combined
return, but few do so.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Industry-Level K-S Statistics
The horizontal axis plots the K-S statistic, D, for each industry in 1999-2001. The figure contains
data on 126 manufacturing industries. The aggregate K-S statistic is 0.317.
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We calculate the K-S statistic for each industry that includes both formal and
informal establishments for every time period in our sample. Figure 4 shows the dis-
tribution of the industry-level K-S statistics relative to the aggregate K-S statistics.22
Recall that the K-S statistic is a measure of the difference between two distributions.
Hence, a smaller K-S statistic indicates a greater degree of overlap between the formal
and informal productivity distributions. The figure clearly shows that there is a much
smaller difference between the formal and informal productivity distributions in the
aggregate (i.e. a larger overlap) as the aggregate K-S statistic is in the bottom tail
of the distribution of K-S statistics for industries. The pattern presented in Figure 4
is robust to survey periods. Roughly 11% of industries have a smaller K-S statistic
than the aggregate. However, the industries that tend to be below the aggregate are
much smaller and are therefore estimated subject to greater error in estimating their
productivities.23 This evidence provides an empirical validation of our theoretical
prediction that there should be greater overlap in the aggregate productivity distri-
butions that within individual industries. It is consistent with strict duality within
industries that is subject to firms determining their productivity through a noisy
process.
6 Conclusion
The principle contribution of this paper is to offer an alterantive explanation for the
seeming contradiction in the literature on informality. Even as the standard theoret-
ical model of Rauch (1991) suggests strict size and productivity dualism, empirical
work has clearly shown overlapping firm size and productivity distributions. Using
22 This exercise is similar to Chetty et al. (2009) which plots placebo estimates relative to a reported
treatment effect.
23 Appendix F contains a similar plot where K-S statistics are scaled by industry size.
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a multi-industry general equilibrium model that nests a sectoral choice decision, we
show that this observation is a natural result of fixed costs that vary across indus-
tries. Within industries, formal sector firms will be larger and more productive than
their informal counterparts. Across industries though, there will be informal firms
that are more productive than some formal firms, reflecting the productivity overlap
documented in the empirical literature. We test this central prediction of our model
using data on Indian manufacturing establishments. We find convincing evidence
that the overlap in aggregate productivity distributions between formal and infor-
mal firms is larger than the overlaps within most industries. While the overlaps still
exists, they are consistent with the theory of strict duality subject to a noisy process
through which firms determine their productivity.
By construction, our model reflects several key features from the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys. The data indicate that at least half of formal sector firms report
competing with informal firms and informal competition is even greater for smaller
firms. Under very general parameters, industries in our model have both formal and
informal firms; however, the existence of these informal firms does not necessarily
imply that they “compete.” We are able to show competition along two margins.
First, we show that larger more productive formal firms lose fewer profits to informal
firms. Undoubtedly, this reflects the data in that these firms are less likely to report
competing with informal firms. Second, we show that industries with higher fixed
costs will contain more productive firms and a smaller percentage of informal firms,
again reflecting the negative relationship between firm size and competition.
We view this paper as an important contribution to the understanding of infor-
mality and the dual view. The tractability of our model, as a natural extension of
Melitz (2003), lends itself to future investigation of other important dimensions of
informality, in particular questions of welfare and impacts of trade policy. We have
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left these as avenues for future research as they likely require a dynamic version
of our model in order to capture costs association with transitions between steady
states. At the same time, a dynamic version of the model may obfuscate important
facts about how formal and informal firms interact. Our model and stylized facts
emphasize that formal and informal firms often compete and operate in the same
markets. By better understanding how firms compete, we can better investigate the
effect of policy on existing firms and the decision of new entrepreneurs to enter the
formal or informal sectors.
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Appendix A Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides pooled summary statistics for our variables of interest.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Weighted
Binary Competition 104,560 50.9% (mean)
Categorical Competition 118,677 1 (median)
Firm Size (perm. full-time) 124,034 65.59 (mean)
Firm Size (all full-time) 120,085 123.73 (mean)
Observations exclude probable typos and non-responses. This standard is used throughout the
paper unless otherwise noted. Measures of central tendency are calculated with the sampling
weights. A value of one for our categorical competition measure implies that the median firm sees
informal firms as a minor obstacle. We drop several observations for temporary labor that are
extreme outliers (10 standard deviations from the mean).
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Appendix B Competition: Cross-Country Regressions
Table 3: Competition: Cross-Country Regressions
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per capita -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.043*** -0.041***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Time fixed effects
2007 -0.078 0.063
2008 -0.161** 0.097
2009 -0.082* 0.086*
2010 -0.066 0.016
2011 -0.113 0.034
2012 -0.106 0.168
2013 -0.149*** 0.042
2014 -0.083 0.058
2015 -0.206*** 0.024
Region fixed effects
Africa 0.012 0.040
Americas 0.099 0.159*
Asia -0.182*** -0.171**
Europe -0.106 -0.098
Constant 0.937*** 1.039*** 0.923*** 0.831***
(0.089) (0.090) (0.119) (0.133)
N 185 185 183 183
The dependent variable is the probability-weighted level of competition for each country surveyed.
All regressions are estimated using OLS. Each country is put into one of five regions: Africa,
Americas, Asia, Europe, or Oceania. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis. All coefficients
are relative to a country from Oceania in 2006. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5%
(**) and 10% (*) levels for a standard two-tailed t-test.
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Appendix C Additional Firm Size and Competition Results
Table 4: Competition and Firm Size: Pooled Regressions
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS Logit Probit
Log firm size -0.0275*** -0.0249*** -0.0377*** -0.1593*** -0.0113***
(0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0264) (0.0041)
Log GDP/capita -0.0371*** -0.0442*** -0.1877*** -0.1132***
(0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0266) (0.0163)
Time fixed effects
2007 -0.0829 -0.3577 0.063
2008 0.0015 -0.0018 0.097
2009 0.0032 0.0029 0.086*
2010 0.1085** 0.4610* 0.016
2011 -0.0469 -0.2023 0.034
2012 0.1254* 0.5164* 0.168
2013 -0.0870 -0.3736 0.042
2014 -0.0532 -0.2330 0.058
2015 0.0125 0.0374 0.024
Region fixed effects
Africa 0.0040 0.0214 0.040
Americas 0.0669 0.2900 0.159*
Asia -0.0223 -0.0886 -0.171**
Europe -0.0596* -0.2421* -0.098
Sector fixed effects no no yes yes yes
Constant 0.5996*** 0.9009*** 1.0201*** 2.2060*** 1.1546***
(0.0181) (0.0509) (0.0820) (0.3599) (0.2164)
N 99,349 84,665 78,621 78,621 78,621
The dependent variable is the binary measure of whether a firm competes with informal firms. Firm
size is measured as the number of permanent full-time employees. All regressions utilize probability
weighting. Regional dummies are Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, or Oceania. Sector fixed effects
are based on two-digit ISIC codes. We drop industries that cannot be estimated with a logit/probit
to maintain the same sample across specifications (3), (4), and (5). The country of Malaysia is
also dropped due to implausible levels of temporary workers (15 firms have greater than 100,000
temporary workers) Standard errors are provided in parenthesis. Asterisks denote significance at
the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Appendix D Proofs
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
D.1.1 Zero Profit Condition
The zero profit condition is given by:
pis(φ∗) = 0⇒ r(φ∗) = σwsf s for s ∈ {I, F}
and depends on the state of the industry. From here it is straightforward to show
that the average revenue in the sector is a function of the cut-off value:
r¯ = r(φ˜) =
[
φ˜
φ∗
]σ−1
r(φ∗) =
[
φ˜(φ∗)
φ∗
]σ−1
σf I
wI
(
ξ
wI
)−σ
(28)
D.1.2 Free Entry
The free entry condition is given by:
Epi = f e, (29)
where the expected profit is equal to:
Epi = pI(1− µ)p¯iI + pF (1− τ)p¯iF , for j ∈ {I, F}.
pj and p¯ij are the probability of entry and the average profit for sector j, respectively.
The probability of a firm being informal or formal is simply the probability of drawing
a productivity within the range [φ∗, φ¯) for informal and the range [φ¯,∞) for formal.
Explicitly, these probabilities are given by:
pI = G(φ¯)−G(φ∗)
pF = 1−G(φ¯). (30)
The free entry condition will also be written in terms of average revenue, rather
than average profit. To do this, first define the average productivity of informal (φ˜I)
and formal (φ˜F ) firms as:
φ˜I =
[
1
G(φ¯)−G(φ∗)
∫ φ¯
φ∗
φσ−1g(φ)dφ
] 1
σ−1
, φ˜F =
[
1
1−G(φ¯)
∫ ∞
φ¯
φσ−1g(φ)dφ
] 1
σ−1
(31)
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From here, the average revenue of informal and formal firms can be written as:
r(φ˜I) =
[
φ˜I
φ˜
]σ−1
wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ
r(φ˜), r(φ˜F ) =
[
φ˜F
φ˜
]σ−1
r(φ˜) (32)
This ultimately means that the average profits of informal and formal firms can be
written as functions of average revenue:
p¯iI =
[
φ˜I
φ˜
]σ−1
wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ
r¯
σ
− f I , p¯iF =
[
φ˜F
φ˜
]σ−1
r¯
σ
− fF (33)
Combining Equations (29), (30), and (33), the free entry condition becomes:
(G(φ¯)−G(φ∗))(1−µ)
[ φ˜I
φ˜
]σ−1
wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ
r¯
σ
− f I
+(1−G(φ¯))(1−τ)
[ φ˜F
φ˜
]σ−1
r¯
σ
− fF
 = f e
(34)
Finally, Equation (34) can be solved for r¯ in order to determine the relationship
between average profits and the cut-off φ∗.
r¯ =
σ(f e + (G(φ¯)−G(φ∗))(1− µ)f I + (1−G(φ¯))(1− τ)fF
(G(φ¯)−G(φ∗))(1− µ)wI ( ξ
wI
)σ [ φ˜I
φ˜
]σ−1
+ (1−G(φ¯))(1− τ)
[
φ˜F
φ˜
]σ−1 (35)
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Formality means that the firm will face a higher fixed cost of production and a certain
tax rate, however they avoid the possibility of losing the entirety of their profit due
to fines in the informal sector. Therefore the expected profit for a given productivity
for each type of firm is:
EpiI(φ) = (1− µ)
[(
φ
φ∗
)σ−1
wIf I − wIf I
]
piF (φ) = (1− τ)
[(
φ
φ∗
)σ−1
f I
(
ξ
wI
)−σ
− fF
] (36)
Based on the assumption above, clearly EpiI(0) > piF (0) and ∂Epi
I(φ)
∂φ
< ∂pi
F (φ)
∂φ
, which
means that there is a single crossing point below which firms will become informal
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and above which firms become formal. Define φ¯ such that: EpiI(φ¯) = piF (φ¯), then
the cut-off is explicitly given by:
φ¯ =
( ξwI )σ (fF (1− τ)− f I(1− µ)wI)
f I
(
(1− τ)− (1− µ)wI ( ξ
wI
)σ)
 1σ−1 φ∗ (37)
D.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First note that:
1−G(φ) =
(
k
φ
)α
G(φ¯)−G(φ∗) =
(
k
φ∗
)α
−
(
k
φ¯
)α
=
(
k
φ∗
)α
−
(
k
Fˆsφ∗
)α
=
(
k
φ∗
)α (
1− Fˆ−αs
)
This implies that:
φ˜ =
[(
φ∗
k
)α(∫ ∞
φ¯
φσ−1g(φ)dφ+ wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ ∫ φ¯
φ∗
φσ−1g(φ)dφ
)] 1
σ−1
=
[(
φ∗
k
)α(
αkα
1 + α− σ (Fˆ φ
∗)−1−α+σ +
αkα
1 + α− σw
I
(
ξ
wI
)σ
(φ∗)−1−α+σ(1− Fˆ−1−α+σ)
)] 1
σ−1
=
(
α
1 + α− σ
) 1
σ−1
[
Fˆ−1−α+σ + wI
(
ξ
wI
)σ
(1− Fˆ−1−α+σ)
]
φ∗
φ˜I =
[(
k
φ∗
)−α (
1− Fˆ−αs
)−1 ∫ φ¯
φ∗
φσ−1g(φ)dφ
] 1
σ−1
=
[(
k
φ∗
)−α (
1− Fˆ−αs
)−1(αkα(φ∗)−1−α+σ
1 + α− φ
)(
1− Fˆ−1−α+σs
)] 1σ−1
=
[(
1− Fˆ−αs
)−1 (
1− Fˆ−1−α+σs
)( α
1 + α− σ
)] 1
σ−1
φ∗
φ˜F =
[(
k
φ¯
)−α ∫ ∞
φ¯
φσ−1g(φ)dφ
] 1
σ−1
=
[(
k
φ¯
)−α(
αkαφ¯−1−α+σ
1 + α− σ
)] 1σ−1
=
(
α
1 + α− σ
) 1
σ−1
Fˆsφ
∗
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D.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. 1. The proof for the first inequality follows from the ratio of φ∗F/φ
∗
I :
φ∗F
φ∗I
=
((
f IwI(1− µ)
fF (1− τ)
)
+ Fˆ−αI
(
1− f
IwI(1− µ)
fF (1− τ)
))− 1
α
> 1
where the inequality follows from the fact that
(
fIwI(1−µ)
fF (1−τ)
)
< 1 and Fˆ−αI < 1.
The second inequality comes from the ratio of φ¯I/φ
∗
F :
φ¯I
φ∗F
= FˆI
((
f IwI(1− µ)
fF (1− τ)
)
+ Fˆ−αI
(
1− f
IwI(1− µ)
fF (1− τ)
)) 1
α
> 1
To see where the inequality comes from, let x =
(
fIwI(1−µ)
fF (1−τ)
)
, then we need:
FˆI((x+ Fˆ
−α
I (1− x))1/α > 1
which can be rearranged to be:
x+ Fˆ−αI (1− x) > Fˆ−αI
rearranging one more time, yields:
Fˆ−αI < 1
which is unambiguously true.
2. Let ρ = (ξ/wI). This result comes about by taking the ratio of the revenues in
each economy:
r¯F
r¯I
=
fF
f I
ρσ
Fˆ−1−α+σ + wIρσ(1− Fˆ−1−α+σ) ≥ 1
The inequality can be seen by setting ρ = (f I/fF ) (its minimum value), which
results in:
r¯F
r¯I
= 1
from there it is straightforward to show that:
∂r¯F/r¯I
∂ρ
> 0
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3. We know that the mass of firms equals M = R/r¯, then this result is simply an
application of the second result.
4. First, we know that total revenue is equal to average revenue times the mass
of firms:
Mr¯ = R
This can also be written as the sum of the total revenue in each sector:
M I r¯I +MF r¯F = R
Note that M = M I +MF , which means the above equation can be written as:
(M −MF )r¯I +MF r¯F = R
Solving for MF yields:
MF =
R
(
1− r¯I
r¯
)
r¯F − r¯I
where the substitution M = R/r¯ is made. Using the definitions of r¯, r¯I , and
r¯F above, we can write the mass of firms in the formal sector as:
MF = Fˆ−α
R
r¯
To get the result above, take the ratio of MF in each economy:
MFI
MFF
=
R
r¯I
Fˆ−αI
R
r¯F
=
fF
f I
ρσ
Fˆ−1−α+σI + wIρσ(1− Fˆ−1−α+σI )
Fˆ−αI ≤ 1
It should be noted that when ρ = (f I/fF )1/σ, that MFI /M
F
F = 1. It can also
be shown that:
lim
ρ→ 1−τ
wI (1−µ)
MFI
MFF
= 0
from there it is easy to show that
∂MFI /M
F
F
∂ρ
< 0
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D.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First note that a firm’s profit can be written as:
pis(φ) =
rs(φ)
σ
− f s
We know that a firm’s revenue can be expressed as a function of the cut-off value φ∗s:
r(φ) =
(
φ
φ∗s
)σ−1
r(φ∗s) =
(
φ
φ∗s
)σ−1
σwsf s
Therefore the ratio of revenue for a given φ across economies is:
rF (φ)
rI(φ)
=
(
φ
φ∗F
)σ−1
σfF(
φ
φ∗I
)σ−1
σf I
=
(
φ∗I
φ∗F
)σ−1
fF
wIf I
≡ χ > 1
Note that the revenue in an economy with only formal firms is proportional to the
revenue in an economy with informal and formal firms. To see how we get the
inequality, substitute for φ∗s and rearrange to get:
χ =
(
ξ
wI
)−σ(σ−1)
α
[
wI
(
1− µ
1− τ
)(
ξ
wI
)σ
+
((
ξ
wI
)σ (
fF
f I
− wI
(
1− µ
1− τ
))(
1− wI
(
1− µ
1− τ
)(
ξ
wI
)σ))]σ−1α
First, let fF = f I , then χ > 1, if:[
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
) (
ξ
wI
)σ(
ξ
wI
)σ (
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
))] ασ−1 > (wI) ασ−1 − wI (1−µ1−τ )(
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
))
This is clearly true if ξ < wI . If ξ > wI , then χ > 1 if:
ξ < wI
wI (1− µ
1− τ
)
+
(
(wI)
α
σ−1 − wI (1−µ
1−τ
)
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
) )σ−1α (1− wI (1− µ
1− τ
))−1/σ
We know that ξ < (wI)σ−1σ, the above inequality holds if:
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[
(wI)
α
σ−1 − wI (1−µ
1−τ
)(
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
)) ]σ−1α ≤ 1
which is clearly true. It is rather straightforward to show that:
∂χ
∂fF
> 0
Therefore χ > 1.
Going back to the ratio of the two revenues, it implies that the percentage of
profit loss is equal to:
PPL(φ) =
rI(φ)(χ− 1)
χrI(φ)− f s
Taking the derivative w.r.t. φ yields:
∂PPL(φ)
∂φ
= −r
′
I(φ)(χ− 1)f s
(χrI(φ)− f s)2 < 0
where r
′
I(·) < 0.
D.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. 1. Result 1
Using the definition of φ∗ above, the ratio of φ∗ between two industries can be
written as:
φ∗i−1
φ∗i
=
(
ρσi f
I
i−1F¯i−1
ρσi−1f
I
i F¯i
) 1
α
By definition:
f Ii−1
f Ii
< 1
To show that (
ρi
ρi−1
)σ
F¯i−1
F¯i
< 1
We need to note that because ξi−1 > ξi ∃ 0 < x < 1, such that ξi−1 = xξi. Also
because
fFi−1
fIi−1
>
fFi
fIi
∃0 < y < 1, such that fFi−1
fIi−1
= y
fFi
fIi
. Using these definitions,
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the inequality above can be written as:[
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
) (
ξ
wI
)σ
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
) (
xξ
wI
)σ
] α
σ−1
(xσ)
α
σ−1 <
[
y f
F
fI
− wI (1−µ
1−τ
)
fF
fI
− wI (1−µ
1−τ
) ]
−1−α+σ
σ−1
It is clear that LHS < 1 < RHS because −1− α + σ < 1.
Therefore
φ∗i−1
φ∗i
=
(
ρσi f
I
i−1F¯i−1
ρσi−1f
I
i F¯i
) 1
α
< 1
2. Result 2
We know that:
r¯i
r¯i−1
=
(
Fˆ−1−α+σi + w
Iρσ(1− Fˆ−1−α+σi
)
(
Fˆ−1−α+σi−1 + wIρσ(1− Fˆ−1−α+σi−1
) (ρi−1
ρi
)σ
f Ii
f Ii−1
We know that f Ii−1 < f
I
i , we need to check if:(
Fˆ−1−α+σi + w
Iρσ(1− Fˆ−1−α+σi
)
(
Fˆ−1−α+σi−1 + wIρσ(1− Fˆ−1−α+σi−1
) (ρi−1
ρi
)σ
> 1
Simplifying yields:[
1− wI ( xξ
wI
)σ
1− wI ( ξ
wI
)σ
]
> xσ
[
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
) (
xξ
wI
)σ
1− wI (1−µ
1−τ
) (
ξ
wI
)σ
]−1−α+σ
σ−1
[
fF
fI
− wI (1−µ
1−τ
)
y f
F
fI
− wI (1−µ
1−τ
)]
−1−α+σ
σ−1
where x and y are as defined above. It is clear that LHS > 1 > RHS, because
−1− α + σ < 0. Therefore r¯i−1 < r¯i.
3. Result 3
The percentage of firms that are formal is:
MF
M
= Fˆ−α
Now we check if
MFi
MFi−1
Mi−1
Mi
> 1
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MFi
MFi−1
Mi−1
Mi
=
x σσ−1 (1− τ − (1− µ)wI ( ξwI )σ
1− τ − (1− µ)wI ( ξx
wI
)σ
) 1
σ−1
(
y f
F
fI
(1− τ)− (1− µ)wI
fF
fI
(1− τ)− (1− µ)wI
) 1
σ−1
−1/α > 1
Based on the definitions of x and y above, this inequality is clearly true.
4. Result 4
As long as φ¯i 6= φ¯j, then there is a range {φ¯j, φ¯i} such that productivities in
that range are formal in one industry and informal in the other. Making the
appropriate substitutions for φ¯ and φ∗, yields:(
ρjf
I
i F¯j
ρif Ij F¯i
) 1
α
6= Fˆj
Fˆi
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Appendix E General Distribution Results
In this appendix we generalize the results found in the main section of paper to
other distributions using numerical methods. The figures below are created using a
log-normal distribution but the results are robust to a wide-range of “well-behaved”
distributions (exponential, gamma, Weibull) and parameter choices.24
Starting with Proposition 1, Figure 6 below graphs the free entry and zero profit
cut-off lines for two economies: one with both informal and formal (I) firms and the
other with only formal firms (F).
Figure 5: Equilibrium cut-off (φ∗) and average revenue (r¯)
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*
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ϕℱ
*
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ϕℐ
ϕ*
r
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ZPCℐ
FEℱ
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The first two results of Proposition 2 are readily apparent. The I economy has
a lower cut-off and average revenue than the economy without informal firms. In
addition, based on average revenue it is clear that the mass of firms is smaller in
the economy with only formal firms. These results together confirm the underlying
intuition of the model, informality allows those firms who otherwise be priced on the
the market to enter. The entry of additional firms creates increased competition,
resulting in lower revenues on average. However, this figure cannot speak to is the
relative size of the formal sector in each economy. This result is given in the figure
below. It should be noted that the figure below is generated by varying the fixed cost
associated with being formal within the range {f I , 1.5 ∗ f I}. The ratios of the mass
of firms (MI/MF) and the mass of formal firms (MFI /M
F
F ) are plotted against the
ratio of the cut-off values (φ∗F/φ
∗
I). It is expected that the ratio of the cut-offs would
rise as the fixed cost of formality rises relative to the fixed cost of being informal.
24 We did not come across a set of parameters that qualitatively changed the results presented in
this section, despite our honest attempts to do so.
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Figure 6: The ratios of the mass of firms (MI/MF) and the mass of formal firms
(MFI /M
F
F ) is plotted against the ratio of the cut-off values (φ
∗
F/φ
∗
I) for an economy
with both formal and informal firms (I) and with only formal firms (F).
1
ϕℱ
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Mℐ/Mℱ
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F/MℱF
Not surprisingly, the mass of firms in the mixed economy rises relative to the
economy with only formal firms as fF increases. This is because as the fixed cost of
formality increases it lowers the number of formal firms. In the formal only economy,
firms that do not become formal exit (lowering the overall number of firms), while in
the I economy these firms simply become informal. The numerical results confirm
that the I economy will see very little change in the mass of firms while the formal
only economy will see a significant decline. What is particularly interesting in this
figure is that despite the fact that the mass of firms in the formal only economy is
falling relative to the mixed economy, the mass of formal firms is relatively increasing.
This means that as the fixed costs of formality increase it causes more firms to
abandon formality in the I economy than those who exit in the formal only economy.
Proposition 3 showed that the firms that were most affected by informal compe-
tition were the ones with relatively low productivity. In Figure 7 below, we consider
this result more generally. The metric of increased competition continues to be the
percentage of profit lost due to informal firms. Consistent with what was shown un-
der the Pareto distribution, the percentage of profit loss is falling in firm productivity.
The most significant losses occur for those firms who would be near the cut-off in a
formal only economy. Those least productive formal firms in the all formal economy
would be most affected by informality. It should be noted that these firms would no
longer be formal in a mixed economy.
The final proposition in the previous section showed that between industries there
is a TFP overlap between formal and informal firms. Figure 8 generalizes this result
for other distributions. To see this suppose there are two industries with different
costs of entry (WLOG assume that f s1 < f
s
2 ). In Figure 8, the productivity range
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Figure 7: Percentage of profit loss due to informal competition
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Figure 8: TFP overlap across industries
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{φ¯2, φ¯1} is comprised of formal firms in industry 1 and informal firms in industry 2.
The reason for this overlap is that the higher cost of entry shrinks the mass of firms,
thus lowering competition and raising the overall price level. The higher price level
means that less productive firms can cover the costs of formality. One of the questions
that arises from Figure 8 is how the percentage of firms that are formal changes with
the fixed costs. Figure 8 shows that increasing the fixed costs of production results
in a higher cut-off, but it is unclear how this changes the distribution of formal
and informal firms. In order to see how the distribution changes, we solve for the
percentage of firms that are formal:
MF
M
=
φ˜σ−1 − (φ˜I)σ−1
(φ˜F )σ−1 − (φ˜I)σ−1
.
Because φ˜F > φ˜ the expression above is clearly between zero and one. Figure 9
below shows how the percentage of formal firms changes as the fixed cost of formal
production changes relative to informal production.
Figure 9: Percent of firms that are formal plotted against quality of institutions.
fF/f I
MF/M
Clearly, the percentage of firms that are formal is decreasing as the fixed costs
increase.
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Appendix F K-S Statistics with Industry Size
Figure 10: Distribution of Industry K-S Statistics by Industry Size
The horizontal axis plots the K-S statistic, D, for each industry in 1999. The figure contains data
on 126 manufacturing industries. The aggregate K-S statistic is 0.317. Small points represent non-
scaled industries, while “bubbles” represent industries that are scaled by the number of firms in
each industry. Note that the size aspect of some industries is covered by larger “nearby” industries.
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